Abstract. Honouring our influences in academia often means disagreeing with them, and with the greatest respect for David Owen’s insights into Nietzsche, this is exactly what I intend to do in this paper. I will focus on one question that is prompted by Owen's Nietzsche work: how and to what degree does Nietzsche’s moral psychology depart from modern moral concepts and values? The relevant point of disagreement between me and Owen is whether Nietzsche’s moral psychology is compatible with modern morality. For Owen, Nietzsche expands the repertoire of moral psychology beyond the narrowly moral to the ethical. I argue instead that Nietzsche does not merely expand moral psychology. Rather, he opposes the narrowly moral with an account of self-development, freedom, and the good that is resolutely immoralist.
Keywords: Nietzsche, moral psychology, immoralism, competition, inequality.
